In the years leading up to World War II, America's foreign policy was marked by a desire to remain neutral in the conflict engulfing Europe and Asia. However, as tensions escalated and aggression intensified, the United States gradually shifted towards a policy of supporting the Allies, primarily Britain and France.
The Neutrality Acts of the 1930s aimed to prevent the United States from becoming entangled in foreign conflicts by imposing arms embargoes and restricting American involvement in trade with belligerent nations. However, as Nazi Germany's expansion threatened global stability, President Franklin D. Roosevelt sought to provide indirect assistance to the Allies through programs like Lend-Lease, which supplied vital war materials to Britain and later the Soviet Union.
The attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, dramatically altered America's stance. President Roosevelt delivered his famous "Day of Infamy" speech the following day, asking Congress to declare war on Japan. This marked the United States' official entry into World War II.
During the war, key documents and policies shaped America's approach to the conflict. The Atlantic Charter, a joint declaration issued by Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in 1941, outlined the Allies' goals for a post-war world based on self-determination and international cooperation principles.
The policy of unconditional surrender, announced by the Allies in 1943, aimed to ensure the complete defeat of the Axis powers, Germany, Italy, and Japan. This uncompromising stance reflected the Allies' determination to achieve lasting peace and hold accountable those responsible for the atrocities committed during the war.
Overall, America's war policies and documents leading up to and during World War II reflected a complex interplay of isolationism, pragmatism, and a growing recognition of the necessity to confront totalitarian aggression to safeguard global security and democracy.
Allies and adversaries : the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. strategy in World War II by
During World War II the uniformed heads of the U.S. armed services assumed a pivotal and unprecedented role in the formulation of the nation's foreign policies. Organized soon after Pearl Harbor as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, these individuals were officially responsible only for the nation's military forces. During the war their functions came to encompass a host of foreign policy concerns, however, and so powerful did the military voice become on those issues that only the president exercised a more decisive role in their outcome. Drawing on sources that include the unpublished records of the Joint Chiefs as well as the War, Navy, and State Departments, Mark Stoler analyzes the wartime rise of military influence in U.S. foreign policy. He focuses on the evolution of and debates over U.S. and Allied global strategy. In the process, he examines military fears regarding America's major allies--Great Britain and the Soviet Union--and how those fears affected President Franklin D. Roosevelt's policies, interservice and civil-military relations, military-academic relations, and postwar national security policy as well as wartime strategy.
American Foreign Policy and Yugoslavia, 1939-1941 by
In American Foreign Policy and Yugoslavia, 1939-1941, Ivo Tasovac contends that Yugoslavia acted as an unwilling prop for American involvement in World War II. As a result of America's commitment to Britain as an exception to their doctrine of neutrality, and of Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt's shared eagerness for conflict and suppression of Germany, the war and ensuing Communist takeover of Eastern Europe were inevitable. With Yugoslavia cast as the endangered barrier between the Germans and the Mediterranean, Churchill was able to establish a unquestionable need for U.S. military action. Britain's leader could seize on the small country as a staging area for activating the Soviets in order to eliminate Italy and weaken Germany in the process. Tasovac contends that pressure from the British government and the American diplomats investigating the situation in fact enforced the Serbian coup d'etat to overthrow Prince Paul of Yugoslavia when he appeared to sympathetic to Germany, even though the Serbians had no intentions of fighting. With all of the ingredients for conflict in place, the ensuing struggle for Yugoslavian freedom was unavoidable. By bringing the war to the Balkans, Churchill and Roosevelt shaped the next half century of international politics and domination. American Foreign Policy towards Yugoslavia documents and analyzes the decisions and policies that made this action so detrimental to Yugoslavia and other Balkan states. Tasovac brings new light to the realities of the engagement in Yugoslavia and the long-standing effects, discarding the appearances of history for the truth.This study is ideal for a broad audience of scholars, including those interested in NATO policies applied to the Balkan states, the relationship between the United States and those states, Franklin D. Roosevelt's influence on the world stage during his presidency and World War II, and the history of Yugoslavia as a whole.
Americans all : good neighbor cultural diplomacy in World War II by
Cultural diplomacy--"winning hearts and minds" through positive portrayals of the American way of life--is a key element in U.S. foreign policy, although it often takes a backseat to displays of military might. Americans All provides an in-depth, fine-grained study of a particularly successful instance of cultural diplomacy--the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA), a government agency established by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1940 and headed by Nelson A. Rockefeller that worked to promote hemispheric solidarity and combat Axis infiltration and domination by bolstering inter-American cultural ties. Darlene J. Sadlier explores how the CIAA used film, radio, the press, and various educational and high-art activities to convince people in the United States of the importance of good neighbor relations with Latin America, while also persuading Latin Americans that the United States recognized and appreciated the importance of our southern neighbors. She examines the CIAA's working relationship with Hollywood's Motion Picture Society of the Americas; its network and radio productions in North and South America; its sponsoring of Walt Disney, Orson Welles, John Ford, Gregg Toland, and many others who traveled between the United States and Latin America; and its close ties to the newly created Museum of Modern Art, which organized traveling art and photographic exhibits and produced hundreds of 16mm educational films for inter-American audiences; and its influence on the work of scores of artists, libraries, book publishers, and newspapers, as well as public schools, universities, and private organizations.
The challenge to isolation : the world crisis of 1937-1940 and American foreign policy by
United States -- Foreign relations -- 1933-1945
World War, 1939-1945 -- United States
World War, 1939-1945 -- Diplomatic history
Crossroads of decision : the State Department and foreign policy, 1933-1937 by
An incisive reinterpretation of New Deal diplomacy.
FDR's ambassadors and the diplomacy of crisis : from the rise of Hitler to the end of World War II by
What effect did personality and circumstance have on US foreign policy during World War II? This incisive account of US envoys residing in the major belligerent countries - Japan, Germany, Italy, China, France, Great Britain, USSR - highlights the fascinating role played by such diplomats as Joseph Grew, William Dodd, William Bullitt, Joseph Kennedy and W. Averell Harriman. Between Hitler's 1933 ascent to power and the 1945 bombing of Nagasaki, US ambassadors sculpted formal policy - occasionally deliberately, other times inadvertently - giving shape and meaning not always intended by Franklin D. Roosevelt or predicted by his principal advisors. From appeasement to the Holocaust and the onset of the Cold War, David Mayers examines the complicated interaction between policy, as conceived in Washington, and implementation on the ground in Europe and Asia. By so doing, he also sheds needed light on the fragility, ambiguities and enduring urgency of diplomacy and its crucial function in international politics.
FDR's Fireside Chats by
United States -- Politics and government -- 1933-1945
United States -- Foreign relations -- 1933-1945
Global logistics and strategy, 1940-1943 by
Introductory: Logistics: the world and the thing -- PART ONE: THE NEUTRALITY PERIOD: Rearmament and foreign aid before Lend-Lease -- War plans and emergency preparations -- The Army and early Lend-Lease operations -- The broadening pattern of Lend-Lease operations -- Widening commitments -- PART TWO: CRISIS: Pearl Harbor and early deployment -- Improvisation in the Pacific -- PART THREE: THE EMERGENCE OF POLICY AND METHOD: Strategy, production goals, and shipping -- The machinery of logistical co-ordination and administration -- Lend-Lease as an instrument of coalition war -- The Anglo-American munitions pool -- The Army's system of requirements and controlled distribution -- The support of overseas operations -- PART FOUR: BUILD-UP AND EARLY OFFENSIVES: Build-up in the British Isles, first phase -- Turning point in the Pacific -- The descent on North Africa -- PART FIVE: THEATERS OF FOREIGN AID: The Anglo-American orbit -- China, Burma, and India -- The long road to Russia, I -- The long road to Russia, II -- PART SIX: THE CASABLANCA PERIOD: STRATEGIC PLANS AND LOGICAL METHOD: War production and shipping: year's end outlook -- Economy and stabilization -- Joint logistical planning and co-ordination -- Casablanca and the strategic-logistical debate -- After Casablanca -- PART SEVEN: CONCLUSION: Logistical planning and its end products -- APPENDICES: A: Shipping terminology and planning data: 1942-43 -- B: Procurement: 1940-43 -- C: Lend Lease transfers -- D: Number of vessels and cargo tonnage shipped from United States to USSR: 22 June 1941-30 June 1943 -- E: Overseas deployment -- F: Overseas supply -- G: Supply responsibilities of the ports of embarkation -- H: Shpping losses and gains -- I: Growth of the service establishment: 1942.
A history of U.S. communications intelligence during World War II : policy and administration by
"A study of high-level policy, administration, and organization of COMINT during WWII and how it was controlled and directed by each military service and how these services related to each other and to their British counterparts"
A loyal opposition in time of war : the Republican Party and the politics of foreign policy from Pearl Harbor to Yalta by
Republican Party (U.S.)
Republican Party (U.S. : 1854- )
World War, 1939-1945 -- Diplomatic history
United States -- Politics and government -- 1933-1945
United States -- Foreign relations -- 1933-1945
The Memoirs of Cordell Hull by
Secretary of State under Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Mobilizing consent : public opinion and American foreign policy, 1937-1947 by
United States -- Foreign relations -- 1933-1945 -- Public opinion
United States -- Foreign relations -- 1945-1953 -- Public opinion
The Ordnance Department : on beachhead and battlefront by
I. The Military missions -- The Special Observer Group -- Ordnance plans for Iceland -- The Lend-lease missions to the Middle East and China -- Initiation into coalition warfare -- II. Middle East kaleidoscope -- The OMET's -- Militarization -- The Desert proving ground -- Applying lessons -- III. Early arrivals in Australia -- The Pensacola convoy -- Last-ditch efforts to aid MacArthur -- Planning the American base -- Port operations -- IV. The Base in Australia -- Rounding up weapons and ammunition -- Ship arming -- Ordnance forces spread thin -- Geelong and the Ordnance Service Centers -- Working with the Australians -- USAAS ordnance -- Midsummer 1942 : new responsibilities -- Preparations to support the move northward -- Responsibility for motor vehicles -- V. Supporting the Papua Campaign -- The Ordnance officer arrives at Port Moresby -- The Crisis in mid-September -- The Sea route to Buna -- The Attack begins -- and stalls -- I Corps takes over -- The Foreward bases -- Captured Japanese matérial -- "A Poor man's war" -- VI. The Base in the British Isles -- Ordnance troops in Magnet -- Planning for Bolero -- Preparations for Torch -- VII. Oran and the Provisional Ordnance Group -- Tactical plans -- Ordnance service : the group concept -- The Landing at Oran -- The Provisional Ordnance Group -- The Move to Northern Tunisia -- Planing for Central Tunisia -- VIII. With II Corps in Tunisia -- The Supply crisis -- "Miracles of maintenance" -- Niblo leaves II Corps -- Supporting the thrust through Gafsa -- The March to Bizerte -- "The End of the beginning" -- IX. The Short campaign in Sicily -- Plans for Husky -- New matérial -- The Invasion fleets depart -- The Landings -- Colonel Nixon's problems -- "A Black eye on
ordnance" -- The Evidence at the end -- X. Salerno and the growth of Fifth Army Ordnance Service -- Niblo's group organization -- "Hell in the dunes" -- "Uninterrupted" ordnance service -- The Search for better organization.
XI. Anzio and artillery -- The Ammunition dumps -- Anzio Annie and the clamor for heavier artillery -- The 240-mm. howitzer and the 8-inch gun -- "Balanced artillery firepower" -- XII. Rome and "the forgotten front" -- The Allies enter Rome -- "The Forgotten front" -- Lessons of the Mediterranean campaigns -- XIII. Arming for the grand campaign -- New methods of supply -- Motor vehicle assembly -- Preparations for a short sea voyage -- Bomb disposal -- The Ordnance plan for Neptune -- "The Best-equipped fighting force" -- XIV. The Far shore of Normandy -- Omaha Beach -- Utah Beach -- Frustrations in the hedgerows -- Expansion after Cobra : Third Army -- XV. The Race across France -- The Campaign in Brittany -- To the Seine and beyond : First Army Ordnance -- Third Army Ordnance in the dash to the Moselle -- Seventh Army in Southern France -- XVI. At the Siegfried Line in Belgium -- The Supply famine -- First Army improvises -- Frustrations at the ports and depots -- The Battle of the Ardennes -- Bastogne and Third Army Ordnance -- XVII. Lessons of the Roer and the Ardennes -- Ninth Army Ordnance -- The Tank duels on the Roer Plain -- Attempts to provide a better tank -- The Zebra mission of February 1945 -- XVIII. Victory in Germany -- Supplies for the last campaign -- Across the Rhine -- Captured enemy matérial -- Ordnance technical intelligence -- After V-E Day.
XIX. From Papua to Morotai -- Developing the bases -- New weapons for jungle warfare -- The Move northward begins with dexterity -- Support of Brewer in the Admiralties -- Hollandia and Aitape -- The Geelvink Bay operations : Wakde, Biak, Noemfoor -- The Sansapor area in the Vogelkop -- Morotai -- XX. The Philippines : Leyte -- The Ordnance Navy : the shop and depot barges -- Planning for Leyte -- A-Day and after -- The Costly base at Leyte -- Eighth Army Ordnance arrives -- Success on Mindoro -- XXI. The Philippines : Luzon -- Ordnance plans for Luzon -- Supporting the Lingayen landings -- The Advance inland -- Clearing the Visayan passages -- XXII. The Philippines : the southern islands -- Palawan and Zamboanga -- The Central Visayan Islands -- Mindanao -- XXIII. Boldly aiming at Okinawa -- A Strongly fortified island -- The Advance in the Central Pacific -- The Hawaiian base -- Tenth Army plans and preparations -- The Landings on Kerama Retto -- XXIV. Crescendo on Okinawa -- The Landings on Hagushi -- Supporting the assault on the Shuri Defenses -- Siege warfare with a difference : the cave positions -- The Ordnance build-up in the mud -- Supply by water -- Bloody finale -- Preparing for Japan -- XXV. The Guns fall silent -- Bibliographical note -- Glossary -- Code names -- Basic military symbols -- Index.
Peace and war, United States foreign policy, 1931-1941 (ebook) by
"On January 2, 1943 the Department of state released a publication entitled 'Peace and war: United States foreign policy, 1931-1941,' containing references to a number of documents concerning the conduct of the foreign relations of the United States during that ten-year period. It was stated at the time that these documents would be published later. They are accordingly published herein, together with a reprint of the publication released on January 2."--Foreword.
On verso of t.-p.: Dept. of state.
The politics of the second front : American military planning and diplomacy in coalition warfare, 1941-1943 by
United States -- Foreign relations -- 1933-1945
Great Britain -- Foreign relations -- 1936-1945
Soviet Union -- Foreign relations -- 1917-1945
The Roosevelt Diplomacy and World War II by
Roosevelt deceived the public, by C. A. Beard.--Roosevelt respected public opinion, by W. L. Langer and S. E. Gleason.--American policy restrained and realistic, by H. Feis.--American policy intentionally provocative, by A. Kubek.--American policy unintentionally provocative, by P. Schroeder.--Pearl Harbor: Washington to blame, by G. Morgenstern.--Pearl Harbor: a failure to anticipate, by R. Wohlstetter.--A naïve attempt to end spheres of influence, by C. Wilmot.--A realistic attempt to end spheres of influence, by A. Schlesinger, Jr. --Shortsighted and destructive, by A. Armstrong.--Considered and useful, by J. L. Snell.--Of little impact, by P. Kecskemeti.--A pro-Russian fiasco, by W. H. Chamberlain.--A realistic response to international conditions, by S. Warren.
The U. S. Army GHQ Maneuvers Of 1941 by
. NOTE: NO FURTHER DISCOUNT FOR THIS PRINT PRODUCT--OVERSTOCK SALE -- Significantly reduced list price while supplies last Discusses pre-World War 2 mobilization maneuvers at General Headquarters that pitted entire field armies against each other in the summer and fall of 1941. Also includes battle maps, black and white photographs, an order of battle, biographical sketches of the principal officers, a bibliography, an index, and a glossary. The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941 is a masterful study of the largest military training exercises ever conducted by a military organization attempting to mobilize and modernize simultaneously during a rapidly changing international security environment. As suggested by Christopher R. Gabel, the maneuvers had an incalculable influence on the development of the American force structure in World War II, giving Army formations experience in teamwork and combined arms. Viewed by Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall as the "combat college for troop leading" for the rising crop of field-grade officers, they also served to test emerging assumptions about doctrine, organization, and equipment. Gabel's work assumes its rightful place as an important and useful addition to the body of historical literature on military training. The evolution of training in the U.S. Army, particularly the linkage between maneuvers and changes in doctrine and organization, is worthy of reflection by military students and those with an interest in maneuvers as field laboratories for simulating large-scale engagements. Related products: Biennial Reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War, 1 July 1939-30 June 1945-Print Hardcover format can be found here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00329-5 Secretaries of War and Secretaries of the Army: Portraits & Biographical Sketches 2010 is available here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00537-9?ctid=1061 The Sergeants Major of the Army (2010) -Print Hardcover format - is available here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00520-4?ctid=1061 Commanding Generals and Chiefs of Staff, 1775-2010: Portraits & Biographical Sketches of the United States Army\'s Senior Officer -Print Hardcover format is available here: https://bookstore.gpo.gov/products/sku/008-029-00538-7?ctid=1061
Ten years in Japan, a contemporary record drawn from the diaries and private and official papers of Joseph C. Grew, United States ambassador to Japan, 1932-1942. by
A Contemporary Record Drawn from the Diaries and Private and Official papers of Joseph C. Grew, United States Ambassador to Japan, 1932-1942
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